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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Blake Davis contends the prosecutor committed misconduct which rises to the level of
fundamental error by disparaging Mr. Davis, the defense argument, and the role of defense
counsel during his rebuttal closing arguments. This reply is necessary to address several of the
State’s responses, which either fail to address the issues raised on appeal or are contrary to the
applicable precedent, particularly in regard to the second prong of the analysis required under
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court should retain this case
because the rationale behind the State’s argument in that respect, which recent dicta from the
Court of Appeals suggests it is willing to endorse, would actually thwart the purpose of Perry if
adopted.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Davis’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct rising to the level of fundamental error in his
closing arguments.

2

ARGUMENT
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct Rising To The Level Of Fundamental Error In His
Closing Arguments

A.

The Misconduct Violated One Of Mr. Davis’ Unwaived Constitutional Rights
As the State points out, because Mr. Davis ultimately pled guilty to the trafficking

charge, the misconduct in the closing arguments would not justify vacating that conviction.
(Resp. Br., p.5.) That is why Mr. Davis repeatedly focused his appellate arguments on “the
relevant convictions” – those for which the jury actually convicted him following the
prosecutorial misconduct. (See, e.g., App. Br., pp.1, 10.)
In regard to the relevant convictions, as Perry itself reiterated, when the prosecutor
commits misconduct, he or she violates the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial. Perry,
150 Idaho at 227; accord United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12 (1985). In this case, the
prosecutor committed three types of misconduct – disparaging the defendant, defense counsel,
and the defense argument. The State’s response focuses on only the first of those three instances
of misconduct. It barely, if at all, responded to the merits on the other two.
First, the State relegates its analysis in regard to Mr. Davis’ claim that the prosecutor
disparaged the defense argument to a footnote, simply asserting (without citation to authority)
that the prosecutor’s argument was proper rebuttal as opposed to ridicule. (Resp. Br., p.6 n.1.)
The applicable precedent, which the State did not address in that footnote, belies its assertion.
The statement in question – “Well surprise surprise, he denied having drugs.” (Tr., p.305) –
went beyond merely commenting on the strength of the defense case; it sought (or had the effect
of seeking) to get the jurors to emotionally reject the defense arguments as absurd. The Court of
Appeals has made it clear that sort of argument crosses the line of what is permissible. See, e.g.,
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State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 576 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Timmons, 145 Idaho 279, 290
(Ct. App. 2007). Additionally, the State implicitly conceded that the prosecutor’s comments in
that regard were designed to address “the entire case.” (See Resp. Br., p.7 (“the entire case was
literally about whether [Mr.] Davis was a ‘doper’ in the sense of someone who uses or deals
drugs.”).) Therefore, that misconduct went to the charges on which Mr. Davis was convicted,
and so, it violated his unwaived constitutional rights.
That also reveals the flaw in the State’s argument about the comments disparaging
defense counsel. The State did not challenge Mr. Davis’ point that those statements were
actually improper.

(See generally Resp. Br.)

Rather, it only argued that, because that

misconduct occurred while the prosecutor was addressing the trafficking charge, the effects of
that misconduct must be limited to the deliberations on that charge. (See Resp. Br., pp.9-10.)
That argument fails to appreciate the fact that the effect of prosecutorial misconduct can be
broader than the prosecutor’s subjective intent, especially when, as here, it speaks to how the
jurors will perceive the ultimate burden of proof.
As the United States Supreme Court has made clear, one of the foundational promises of
the Constitution is to have the State’s evidence subjected to the crucible of meaningful
adversarial testing, and that can occur simply by defense counsel asking the jury to hold the State
to the heavy burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Cronic, 466
U.S. 648, 656, 656 n.19 (1984). Thus, when the prosecutor goes beyond merely commenting on
the weaknesses in the defense case and attacks defense counsel for asking the jury to hold the
State to its actual burden, even if he or she does so unintentionally, the result is that the
prosecutor is effectively asking the jurors to ignore the protection recognized in Cronic and
lower the burden of proof. See, e.g., State v. Baruth, 107 Idaho 651, 657 (Ct. App. 1984)

4

(finding misconduct occurred because “[t]hese statements had the effect—if not the intent—to
disparage Baruth’s attorney. All three statements unfairly cast the role of a defendant’s counsel”
and so were error (though ultimately, not reversible error)).

Because the effect of that

misconduct can impact how the jurors approach all the charges, the prosecutor’s misconduct in
disparaging defense counsel would also violate Mr. Davis’ rights in regard to the charges on
which he was convicted.
Finally, in regard to the instance of misconduct the State did address on the merits, the
State conceded that the use of the term “doper” was designed to affect “the entire case” because
“the entire case was literally about whether [Mr.] Davis was a ‘doper’ in the sense of someone
who uses or deals drugs.” (Resp. Br., p.7) As such, the State has effectively conceded that
comment, if improper, would impact on Mr. Davis’ constitutional rights in regard to the charges
on which he was actually convicted.
Accordingly, the State only contends that those comments were not actually improper.
(See Resp. Br., pp.5-9.) That argument is actually belied by the State’s concession that the
prosecutor used that term to cast the case in a particular light. The term “doper” by its plain and
ordinary meaning, invokes the image of a frequent and habitual drug user, an “addict,” “user,”
“pothead,” or “fiend.” See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY

AND

THESAURUS, 240 (2007)

(defining the term “doper” and providing those synonyms for the term). By using that sort of
purely emotional rhetoric about the defendant – by placing an unnecessary disparaging label on
him – the prosecutor went beyond merely commenting on the evidence. See, e.g., State v. Gross,
146 Idaho 15, 18 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 716 (Ct. App. 2003). As the
Court of Appeals succinctly put it: “Closing argument should not include . . . inflammatory
words employed in describing the defendant,” since doing so invites the jury to convict based on
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tis reaction to the inflammatory label rather than the evidence presented. Gross, 146 Idaho at 18.
The inflammatory label, once associated with the defendant, follows him through the analysis on
all the charges against him.
Certainly, prosecutors do not have to mechanically argue the elements of the case. See,
e.g., State v. Frauenberger, 154 Idaho 294, 304 (Ct. App. 2013); State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176,
188-89 (Ct. App. 2011). However, there is still a line that they must be conscious of, and the
prosecutor’s use of the purely emotional rhetoric in this case is more like the improper
statements in Gross, Kuhn, Beebe, and Timmons than it is to the legitimate arguments in
Frauenberger and Norton.

(See App. Br., pp.6-7.)

As such, those comments constitute

misconduct and would violate Mr. Davis’ unwaived constitutional rights on the charges for
which the jury convicted him. Therefore, Mr. Davis has met the first prong of Perry in regard to
all the instances of misconduct.

B.

Under A Proper Understanding Of Perry And Its Progeny, The State’s Mere Speculation
That There Might Have Been Some Sort Of Tactical Reason Behind Trial Counsel’s
Failure To Object To The Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Insufficient To Undermine
Mr. Davis’ Showing That The Error Was Clear From The Face Of The Record
The only argument the State makes in regard to the second prong of the Perry analysis is

that Mr. Davis has not shown the lack of objection was not a tactical decision by trial counsel.
(Resp. Br., p.7.) However, it cites no authority supporting that argument, and it points to no facts
in the record suggesting that defense counsel was actually employing a tactical strategy.
(See Resp. Br., p.7.) Rather, that argument is based only on the State’s mere speculation that a
trial strategy might potentially have been in play. (Resp. Br., p.7.) That argument is wholly
improper under Perry and its progeny. In fact, adopting it would render Perry a nullity, and
cause more problems in the long term.

Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals has recently
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indicated, in dicta, that it is willing to adopt the rationale behind that argument. See, e.g., State v.
Merrill, ___ P.3d ___, 2018 WL 3679672, *4 (Ct. App. Aug. 3 2018), rev. pending; State v.
Miller, ___ P.3d ___, 2018 WL 3413827, *4 n.2 (Ct. App. July 13, 2018), rev. pending.1 Given
a proper understanding of Perry and its progeny, however, this Court should refuse to adopt the
State’s argument and follow the path that Perry actually established instead.

1.

The State’s argument is directly contrary to Perry and its progeny

The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that the only thing the appellate courts are
supposed to look at under the second prong of the test for fundamental error is “whether
additional evidence is required from the record.” State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214, 221 (2014)
(emphasis from original). As such, if there is no need for additional evidence to see what
happened and that it was improper, the second prong is met. See id. Thus, in Easley, the second
prong was met because “Easley’s attorney objected to the prosecutorial veto on numerous
grounds and tried very hard to get her into a mental health program. The district court was very
clear about the procedure in the Fifth Judicial District . . . . No additional evidence is require to
establish that the court contracted away its sentencing authority, which it cannot do.” Id.
As such, while the second prong of Perry does consider the potential impact a tactical
decision by trial counsel might have, that analysis is still focused on what the face of the record

1

Accord State v. Ritchie, 2018 WL 3946919, *4 n.3 (Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2018), rev. pending;
State v. Zavala, 2018 WL 3213623, *4 (Ct. App. July 2, 2018), rev. pending; State v. Derrick,
2018 WL 3060513, *3 (Ct. App. June 21, 2018); State v. Jones, 2018 WL 1024006, *4 (Ct. App.
Feb. 23, 2018), rev. denied; see also State v. Kerr, 163 Idaho 656, ___, 417 P.3d 982, 985
(Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2018) (noting a difficulty in reconciling the argument under the second prong
of Perry with the fact that trial counsel, who was also appellate counsel, had not made a record
as to whether or not the decision to not object was tactical). Only Jones and Kerr had been
issued when Mr. Davis filed his Appellant’s Brief.
The petitions for review currently pending in Merrill, Miller, and Zavala are based, in
part, on this issue in regard to the second prong of Perry.
7

shows. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. If the face of the record reveals trial counsel is actually
employing a tactical strategy, then the face of the record does not clearly show an actual error,
but where there is no such indication on the face of the record, the error remains clear based on
evidence showing the improper act. Id. at 230; State v. Parton, 154 Idaho 558, 568 (2013);
State v. Sutton, 151 Idaho 161, 166-67 (Ct. App. 2011). Thus, the State’s mere speculation that
trial counsel might have been potentially employing a strategic decision in this case without
pointing to anything in the record that might indicate defense counsel was actually employing
such a strategy is an insufficient basis on which to reject Mr. Davis’ contention that the error is
clear from the face of the record.
That is, in fact, what the Idaho Supreme Court explained in Parton. In that case, as here,
“Defendant asserts, ‘considering the clarity of the law on this subject [prosecutorial misconduct
by commenting on the defendant’s silence], along with the fact that there could have been no
reasonable strategic basis for defense counsel to not have objected, it is clear that the error was
plain.’” Parton, 154 Idaho at 568. Similarly, “[i]n response, the State asserts that Defendant’s
trial counsel may have declined to object because he did not think the testimony was
objectionable or he was sandbagging.” Id. The Supreme Court rejected the State’s arguments
for two reasons. First, it explained that defense counsel’s ignorance of the impropriety of the
prosecutor’s conduct inherently precluded the conclusion that the decision was tactical. Id.
Second, “[w]ith respect to the possibility of sandbagging, the State does not offer any reason to
suspect that might have occurred.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, Parton reaffirmed that, if the
face of the record shows the misconduct and does not show trial counsel actually employing a
potential defense strategy in the face of that misconduct, the State’s mere speculation that a
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potential strategy might have existed is not enough for the Court to find that the defendant has
not satisfied the second prong of Perry.2 Id.
Likewise, in Sutton, the defendant alleged that the elements instruction was erroneous
because it did not include a necessary element of the offense (i.e., error clearly seen from the
copy of the instruction in the record). Sutton, 151 Idaho at 166. In response, “[t]he State argues
that the error in this case does not plainly exist, because Sutton’s failure to object may have been
for tactical reasons.” Id. Specifically:
The State asserts the instructional error should have been obvious to Sutton . . . .
The State hypothesizes that defense counsel knew the instruction was error. The
State speculates that Sutton decided not to object because the instructional error
was minimal and Sutton could attempt to secure acquittal on his alibi defense,
knowing that in the event he lost he could appeal and claim the instruction was
error with the hope of receiving a new trial. The State contends this is exactly the
type of “sandbagging” that Perry, [150 Idaho at 224] and Puckett v. United States,
566 U.S. 129 . . . (2009), warned against.
Sutton, 151 Idaho at 166.
The Court of Appeals in Sutton, like the Idaho Supreme Court in Parton, rejected the
State’s arguments for two reasons. “First, there is no indication in the record that Sutton knew
any more about the law than the State or the trial court, nor is there any evidence or indication
that Sutton was attempting to sandbag the court. There is no evidence that Sutton presented this
instruction to the court.” Id. (emphasis added). Second, the facts to which the State pointed in
support of its speculations were not as clearly supportive as the State had claimed.

Id.

Considering what the facts in the record actually showed, “[w]e are left with only the State’s
speculation that Sutton made a tactical decision not to object.

2

This Court concludes that

Parton ultimately did not determine whether the record in that case actually revealed whether
defense counsel was employing a strategy because the analysis on the third prong was
dispositive, as it showed any error in that regard was not prejudicial. Parton, 154 Idaho at 568.
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information outside the record is not necessary to determine that Sutton’s failure to object was
not a strategic decision.” Id. at 167. In fact, the Court of Appeals concluded, “a reasonable trial
strategist would have wanted the instruction to require the jury to find, beyond a reasonable
doubt, [all the elements of the offense].” Id. As such, it found the defendant in that case had met
the second prong of Perry. Id.
The Court of Appeals reiterated its holding from Sutton in State v. Day, were it explained
that the defendant in that case met the second prong of Perry because there was no indication in
the record that the defendant had actually attempted to sandbag the court.3 State v. Day, 154
Idaho 476, 481-82 (Ct. App. 2013). Thus, as in Sutton and Parton, since the face of the record in
Day did not indicate trial counsel was actually employing some sort of strategy, the identification
of the otherwise-clear error was sufficient to satisfy the second prong of Perry. Id.
The Court of Appeals has continued to apply this rule in unpublished opinions. E.g.,
State v. Gomez, 2017 WL 1927751, *8 (Ct. App. 2017) (regarding the failure to give a unanimity
instruction); State v. Anderson, 2013 WL 6860714, **11-12 (Ct. App. 2013) (regarding a claim
of prosecutorial misconduct via vouching); State v. Lay, 2013 WL 55581110, *4 (Ct. App. 2013)
(regarding use of an enhancement not noticed in the charging document); State v. Meadows,
2012 WL 9494159 (Ct. App. 2012) (regarding a variance).4

3

Though Sutton and Day both dealt with errors in the jury instructions, their analysis under the
second prong of Perry is still applicable to Mr. Davis’ case because, as Perry itself made clear,
there is no reason to treat prosecutorial misconduct different from any other errors. Perry, 150
Idaho at 220.
4
Mr. Davis recognizes that unpublished decisions do not constitute precedent, and he does not
cite them as authority for a particular decision in this case. Rather, he merely references them as
historical examples of how a learned court has analyzed this question. Compare Staff of Idaho
Real Estate Comm’n v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 634 (2001) (quoting Bourgeois v. Murphy, 119
Idaho 611, 617 (1991)) (“When this Court had cause to consider unpublished opinions from
other jurisdictions because an appellant had discussed the cases in his petition, we found the
presentation of the unpublished opinions as ‘quite appropriat[e].’ Likewise, we find the hearing
10

Moreover, the Supreme Court has indicated that the existence of a potential trial strategy
is not dispositive to the second prong’s analysis. On more than one occasion, the Idaho Supreme
Court found clear error even when the record reveals that trial counsel was employing an
arguably-reasonable trial strategy. State v. Vasquez, 163 Idaho 557, ___, 416 P.3d 108, 113
(2018); Easley, 156 Idaho at 221. In Vasquez, for example, trial counsel stipulated to a bench
trial in a case which involved allegations that the defendant had intimidated a witness in regard
to allegations of sexual assault she had made against the defendant’s brother. Vasquez, 416 P.3d
at 109-10. Even if it might have arguably been reasonable to seek a court trial in such a case,
there was no reasonable strategy for not following the applicable rule and securing the
defendant’s personal waiver of his right to a jury trial. See id. at 113. Therefore, the Supreme
Court held the error was clear under the second prong of Perry despite what the record showed
about trial counsel’s actions. Id. at 113.
Likewise, in Easley, the record was clear that defense counsel had made multiple
objections on other grounds trying to challenge the district court’s refusal to consider ordering
the defendant to participate in the mental health court program. Easley, 156 Idaho at 221. The
Court of Appeals has indicated the failure to object on a particular ground, especially when
objecting on grounds instead, can be a strategic decision. See, e.g., Merrill, 2018 WL 3679672,
*4; State v. Diaz, 163 Idaho 165, ___, 408 P.3d 920, 924-25 (Ct. App. 2017), rev. denied.
Nevertheless, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court’s ultimate decision to not
authorize mental health court in Easley was clear error under the second prong of Perry because
the process used violated the separation of powers doctrine, thereby depriving the defendant of

officer’s consideration of the unpublished opinion, not as binding precedent but as an example,
was appropriate.”).
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his due process right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard on viable sentencing options.
Easley, 156 Idaho at 221-23.5 Thus, whatever strategic decision might have been at play in those
cases was not enough to reject the defendants’ arguments under the second prong of Perry.
Of course, when the record has actually shown that defense counsel made a tactical
choice which raised questions about whether there was, in fact, an error, the courts have not been
hesitant to reject claims of fundamental error. In Perry itself, for example, the Supreme Court
pointed out that the record clearly showed defense counsel objecting to one instance of
prosecutorial vouching, but not others. Perry, 150 Idaho at 230. As a result, the Court explained
the record was not clear as to whether there was error in light of that possible defense strategy to
not object to the other instances of vouching. Id. That meant the claim failed on the second
prong. Id.
Similarly, in State v. Adams (the case Perry gave as an example of how tactical decisions
affect the analysis on the second prong of the fundamental error review, Perry, 150 Idaho at 226
n.5), the Court of appeals found no error in the district court’s failure to not sua sponte remove
an allegedly-biased juror from the panel. State v. Adams, 147 Idaho 857, 861 (Ct. App. 2009).
As the Court of Appeals explained, the record in that case actually showed the juror’s bias was
directed only at the judicial process (the potential holding of hearings outside the jurors’
presence), not at the defendant himself. Id. at 862. More importantly, the record showed that
trial counsel did not ask any questions trying to see if the juror’s bias actually did extend to the

5

Even though Easley reversed the decision at issue due to fundamental error in the face of
defense counsel’s objections to that decision on other grounds, the Court of Appeals in Diaz held
that, when defense counsel objects on one ground, he is barred from raising a claim of
fundamental error on a different ground. Diaz, 408 P.3d at 924-25; accord State v. Briggs, 162
Idaho 736, 739 (Ct. App. 2017), rev. denied. That contradiction of clear Idaho Supreme Court
precedent only reaffirms that Perry and its progeny are not being correctly understood, and so,
the Supreme Court should retain this case to reaffirm the proper understanding of Perry.
12

defendant himself; rather, it showed defense counsel affirmatively rehabilitating that juror,
securing an agreement that the juror would try to not hold that bias against the defendant. Id. at
860-61. Because the record showed defense counsel actually employing an arguably-reasonable
strategy (to keep this juror so as to prevent a potentially worse juror from taking her place), the
Court of Appeals held there was no clear error in that case. Id. at 862.
Likewise, in State v. Grove (hereinafter, Grove I), the Court of Appeals rejected the
defendant’s claim that his constitutional right to confrontation had been violated when two
expert witnesses were allowed to testify based off the report prepared by a third expert who the
defense had not been able to cross-examine. Grove I, 151 Idaho 483, 492 (Ct. App. 2011). The
Court of Appeals pointed out that the record showed defense counsel actually trying to gain a
tactical advantage from the author’s absence, as he attacked the credibility of the report’s
conclusions without the author there to rebut those challenges. Id. As a result, “we conclude
that we cannot ascertain from the record whether Grove’s failure to object to the [other experts’]
testimony as to [the author’s] findings and conclusions was not a tactical decision—the record
simply does not eliminate the possibility that the failure to object was strategic.” Id.
To the extent that Grove I was actually based on the lack of affirmative proof that the
there was no strategic reason for not objecting, rather than just on the fact that the apparent
strategic decision made the record unclear, it has been abrogated by the subsequent Supreme
Court decisions in Parton, Easley, and Vasquez. As discussed supra, those cases all make it
clear that the record does not need to eliminate the possibility of a strategic decision for the error
to be clear under the second prong of Perry. Understanding that limitation, Grove I is simply
another example of how to conduct the second-prong analysis – where the record actually
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indicates trial counsel was employing a strategy designed to gain an advantage from the error,
rather than object to it, the second prong of Perry is not satisfied.
In fact, the Court of Appeals has, in a recent unpublished opinion, drawn this very line
between these two sets of cases. 6 Gomez, 2017 WL 1927751, *8. The Gomez Court concluded
that, “unlike Grove, where the defendant’s failure to object could have given the defendant a
strategic advantage, we recognize no potential advantage to not obtaining a unanimity instruction
in Gomez’s case.” Id. Rather, “[s]imilar to Sutton, we are left with nothing more than the
State’s speculation that Gomez failed to object in the absence of a unanimity instruction in the
hopes of gaining a tactical advantage by curing the error himself. Such speculation is not
sufficient to introduce ambiguity into the record.” Id. “Thus, we conclude that additional
information outside the record is not necessary to determine that Gomez’s failure to object was
not a tactical decision. Gomez has satisfied the second prong of Perry.” Id.
And yet, despite the Idaho Supreme Court’s and Court of Appeals’ repeated holding that
mere speculation by the State is not sufficient to undermine an argument under the second prong
of Perry, the State still argued here, without citation to any authority, that this Court should find
the error in Mr. Davis’ case to be not clear based only on its speculation that his failure to object
to the prosecutor’s disparaging comments was strategic.

(Resp. Br., p.7.)

Specifically, it

speculates that trial counsel either did not believe the objection would have been sustained or
that she did not want to call more attention to the issue, as the prosecutor potentially might have
rephrased and repeated the same argument in response to such an objection (as opposed to

6

As before, Gomez is only cited here as a historical example of how the Court of Appeals has
dealt with this issue, not as precedent demanding a similar result in this case.
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simply moving on with his argument).7 (Resp. Br., p.7.) Just like the nearly-identical arguments
in Parton and Sutton, the State’s arguments here are wrong for two reasons.
The first of the State’s speculative arguments was actually directly rejected by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Parton. The prosecutor’s arguments in this case were disparaging on their
face, and the law is clear that the prosecutor commits misconduct, which is objectionable and
reversible, when he disparages the defense, defendant, or defense counsel. (See App. Br., pp.4-9
(detailing the relevant law and facts in that regard).) Thus, as in Parton, the State’s contention –
that trial counsel’s failure to object was based on her speculated ignorance of the law regarding
prosecutorial misconduct – actually inherently disproves the State’s argument that her failure to
object was tactical. Compare Parton, 154 Idaho at 568.
In its second argument, the State has not pointed to any evidence in the record suggesting
that defense counsel was actually trying to prevent attention from being drawn to Mr. Davis’
alleged drug use.8 (See generally Resp. Br.) Since the State has not identified anything in the

7

Though it does not cite it, the State’s argument reflects the analysis the Court of Appeals used
in State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 543 (Ct. App. 2012). Thumm, however, was contrary to
Sutton, which had been issued the year before. See Sutton, 151 Idaho at 161. That inconsistency
was resolved the following year when both the Idaho Supreme Court in Parton and the Court of
Appeals in Day endorsed the Sutton approach. See, e.g., State v. Moad, 156 Idaho 654, 658 n.3
(Ct. App. 2014) (explaining that, when opinions are actually inconsistent with each other, the
Idaho Supreme Court’s most recent decision on the topic represents the controlling law).
Therefore, the State’s failure to cite Thumm is actually understandable – Thumm, like Grove I,
has been abrogated by Parton, which means it would not have supported the State’s argument in
that regard.
8
The second of the State’s arguments is specific to Mr. Davis’ contention that the prosecutor
disparaged Mr. Davis by using the pejorative term “doper” to refer to Mr. Davis. (See Resp.
Br., p.7.) As such, that argument has no relevance to Mr. Davis’ other claims – that the
prosecutor committed misconduct by disparaging the defense argument or defense counsel. That
is not surprising since, as noted in Section A, supra, the State chose not to argue the merits of
either of those two other claims of misconduct. Therefore, regardless of how this Court resolves
the claim of disparaging Mr. Davis, it should find the other two claims of misconduct are clear
from the face of the record since the State has not even tried to speculate that there might have
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record even hinting that defense counsel was actually employing a strategy to that effect, the
error remains clear on the face of the record. See Parton, 154 Idaho at 568; Day, 154 Idaho at
481-82; Sutton, 151 Idaho 166-67.
At any rate, the record disproves the State’s speculation in that regard. In her closing
argument, defense counsel specifically asked the jury to evaluate the State’s contention that
Mr. Davis had been using drugs. (Tr., p.291.) Specifically, she asked the jury to reject that
argument because the facts upon which it was based were equally attributable to rousing a sober
person from a deep sleep, which the evidence showed the officers had done to Mr. Davis.
(Tr., p.291.) Because she actually drew the jurors’ focus to the claimed drug use, the arguments
that defense counsel actually made reveal that she was not following the strategy the State now
speculates she could have been using.
Rather, the face of the record reveals this case is more like State v. Skunkcap,
State v. Eddins, and State v. Betanourt, all of which dealt with claims of fundamental error
involving prosecutorial misconduct. State v. Skunkcap, 157 Idaho 221, 235 (2014); State v.
Eddins, 156 Idaho 645, 649 (Ct. App. 2014); State v. Betancourt, 151 Idaho 635, 639-40
(Ct. App. 2011). The failure in each of those cases could, hypothetically, have been due to the
same strategy the State speculates was present in Mr. Davis’ case, but in each of them, the
Supreme Court or Court of Appeals still found the error to be clear under the second prong of
Perry. Id. That is because no additional evidence was needed to determine what the prosecutor
actually said in those cases or to recognize those arguments were improper. See Easley, 156
Idaho at 221 (defining what the second prong of the test for fundamental error is actually

been strategic reasons for not objecting to those improper comments. The record, of course, does
not even hint that there was a strategy being employed in that regard. (See generally R., Tr.)
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reviewing). In other words, since there was no advantage a reasonable trial strategist could be
trying to gain by not seeking to prevent the prosecutor trying to secure a verdict based on the
jurors’ passions or prejudices rather than the evidence, the error remained clear from the face of
the record even taking trial strategy into account. Compare Sutton, 151 Idaho at 166.
Here, too, the misconduct is clear from the face of the record because the record reveals
what the prosecutor’s statements actually were and no additional evidence is required to see that
they are improper. Since there is no indication that trial counsel was actually employing a
strategy, much less a reasonable strategy, by not objecting to those improper attempts to get the
jury to decide the case based on something besides the evidence, Mr. Davis has met the second
prong of Perry.

2.

Adopting the rationale behind the State’s argument would thwart Perry and cause
more problems in the long term

In light of a proper understanding of Perry and its progeny, the rationale behind the
State’s argument (which the Court of Appeals has indicated, in dicta, it is prepared to endorse) is
revealed to be just an answer looking for a problem. Worse, that answer would actually thwart
the purpose of Perry and cause more problems than it would potentially solve.
Here, it is important to remember the reason Perry was necessary in the first place. The
Idaho Supreme Court explained that “[m]ultiple statements of the law pertaining to the
fundamental error doctrine have caused confusion” and resulted in three distinct problems:
(1) the definition it had been using for fundamental error was at odds with the Court’s precedent
for constitutional claims; (2) the courts were using a different standard to assess unobjected-to
incidents of prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments and unobjected-to instances of
prosecutorial misconduct in other portions of the proceedings; and (3) the courts were using
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different standards for evaluating whether certain errors were prejudicial or harmless. Perry, 150
Idaho at 219-20. As such, the Perry Court spent two years carefully crafting an opinion which
would correct those problems and eliminate the confusion by providing a workable standard for
the courts to use going forward. See id. at 209. In fact, the Court actually drafted three different
versions of the opinion in its effort to accomplish that goal. See 2010 WL 2880156 (withdrawn
opinion in Perry); 2010 WL 2681154 (same).
Ultimately, when the final version of the opinion was released, Perry explained that the
rule it announced was designed to strike the appropriate balance between the “strong societal
interests in the finality of judgements, and the associated incentive that must be given for
defendants to properly object before a trial court,” and “the sense of fundamental justice inherent
in the concept of a fair trial.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 225 (internal quotations omitted). In regard to
unobjected-to errors, that balance meant there needed to be a mechanism through which a limited
set of critically-important claims regarding constitutional violations could be reviewed on direct
appeal. Id. at 224-25; accord I.R.E. 103(d) (“A court may take notice of a plain error affecting a
substantial right, even if the claim of error was not properly preserved.”).
However, adopting the rationale behind the State’s argument would actually preclude
such claims from being raised in direct appeal because it would essentially turn fundamental
error review into a review for ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Merrill, 2018 WL
3679672, *4 (citing Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 662 (Ct. App. 2007)).9 The standard for

9

The reliance on Mintun is particularly misplaced because the Court of Appeals in that case was
actually evaluating a claim that appellate counsel had been ineffective for not raising a claim on
appeal under fundamental error. Mintun, 144 Idaho at 661. The potential strategies that could
affect trial counsel’s decision to not object in the first place are inherently different from the
potential strategies that affect whether or not to raise an issue on appeal, and so, cross-applying
Mintun’s standard in post-conviction for assessing the strategic decisions of appellate counsel to
an evaluation on direct appeal of whether trial counsel’s failure to object amounted to
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ineffective assistance of counsel requires the defendant to prove a negative – he has to
affirmatively show that counsel did not fail to act due to a strategic purpose. E.g., Estrada v.
State, 143 Idaho 558, 561 (2006) (“When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
strategic and tactical decisions will not be second-guessed or serve as a basis for post-conviction
relief unless the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the
relevant law or some other shortcomings capable of objective review.”). Because it requires
proof of the reason behind something that did not happen on the record, the evidence necessary
to evaluate a claim under that standard will, in the vast majority of cases, not be included in the
record on direct appeal. See, e.g., Miller, 2018 WL 3413827, *4 n.2. That is, in fact, the very
reason Idaho’s courts have made it clear claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should not be
raised on direct appeal, but rather, are to be left for post-conviction. E.g., State v. Hayes, 138
Idaho 761, 766 (Ct. App. 2003). As such, Perry cannot use that same standard and still achieve
its goal of allowing these claims to be raised on direct appeal. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 224-25.
That is why, when Perry said to consider potential trial strategies, that review is still
limited to what is evident from the face of the record – that is the only information properly
before the appellate court in direct appeal, and so, it is the only information the appellate court
could properly consider while reviewing potential fundamental errors. As such, cross-applying
the standard from ineffective assistance claims to the analysis under the second prong of Perry
would render Perry a nullity – it would prevent those claims which Perry said are so important
that they need to be addressed in the direct appeal from being raised on direct appeal. 10

fundamental error is even less appropriate than just cross-applying the standard for ineffective
assistance of counsel to the direct appeal.
10
In fact, the Court of Appeals’ dicta actually recognizes that reading Perry in that manner has
caused problems in applying the second prong of the Perry test. See, e.g., Miller, 2018 WL
3413827, *4 n.2 (asserting this has made application of the second prong “challenging”);
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That also reveals the deeper problem with adopting the rationale behind the State’s
argument: because the direct claims of constitutional error could not be raised on direct appeal
under the rationale behind the State’s argument, they would have to be raised in post-conviction,
but the Court of Appeals has already held that the direct constitutional claims cannot be raised in
post-conviction. Grove v. State (hereinafter, Grove II), 161 Idaho 840, 851-52 (Ct. App. 2017),
rev. denied. In Grove II, the Court of Appeals refused to consider the petitioner’s direct claim
that his constitutional right to confrontation had been violated because he had already tried and
failed to raise that claim as fundamental error in the direct appeal.11 Id. at 850-51. Moreover,
the Court of Appeals refused to consider the merits of the petitioner’s other direct claim of
constitutional error (prosecutorial misconduct) because, though he had not raised it as
fundamental error, he still could have done so. Id. at 852. Thus, Grove II makes it clear that the
defendant must raise the direct constitutional claim in the direct appeal. Id.
As a result, adopting the rationale behind the State’s argument would create the perverse
scenario where a defendant whose constitutional rights were violated would have no meaningful
opportunity to raise the direct claim of constitutional error. That means the rationale behind the
State’s argument comes with a cloak of independent due process concerns.

See, e.g.,

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (holding that due process requires, at a minimum,
notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard).

Moreover, a collateral attack based on

cf. State v. Hoskins, ___ P.3d ___, slip. op. at *5 (Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2018) (rejecting the State’s
argument which would have resulted in reading Idaho Supreme Court decisions discordantly
when those opinions could, in fact, be read harmoniously), not yet final.
11
As discussed supra, the defendant in that case was unable to show clear error because the
record indicated his trial counsel was trying to gain a strategic advantage by attacking the
credibility of the report in question without the author there to refute those attacks. Grove I, 151
Idaho at 490-92.
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ineffective assistance of counsel is not a viable substitute for the direct constitutional attack
because of the presumptions that exist in regard to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Besides thwarting the purpose of Perry, the rationale behind the State’s argument ignores
the realities of trial work. As Easley demonstrates, the determination of whether to object “must
usually be made literally on a split second basis,” and “[e]ven in the computer age of today,
however, it is hard to imagine anyone actually running through all [the relevant] factors in the
five to ten seconds available” in which to recognize and articulate all potential bases for
objection. Steven Lubet, “Objecting,” 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 213, 224 (Summer 1992); see
Easley, 156 Idaho at 221 (wherein trial counsel’s efforts to raise all possible objections during
the exchange with the district court at the sentencing hearing did not prevent him successfully
raising a claim of fundamental error in regard to the constitutional objection trial counsel missed
in that exchange).
Moreover, the trial attorney has to conduct that split-second, high-pressure analysis while
also dealing with all the other pressing aspects of representation, such as client management. Id.
at 218. Thus, in reality, all it takes is a momentary focus on one of the other balls defense
counsel is trying to juggle during a hearing for him to miss the opportunity to object to a
particular question or statement by the prosecutor, the court, or a witness. See also Sutton, 151
Idaho at 166 (indicating that we do not hold defense counsel to a higher standard than the
prosecutor or the trial court in this respect).
It is precisely those realities that Perry recognized and provided for. See Perry, 150
Idaho at 225 (striking a balance between the desire for contemporaneous objections and the
fundamental interests of justice). As the Fifth Circuit succinctly put it in regard to the federal
equivalent to Idaho’s fundamental error rule, that rule “recognizes that not all failures to object
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are strategic. Indeed, some (maybe most) of the time, the failure to object is the product of
inadvertence, ignorance, or lack of time to reflect.” United States v. Escalante-Reyes, 689 F.3d
415, 422 (5th Cir. 2012), en banc; see Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.
For all those reasons, this Court should reject the State’s argument, which only seeks to
read a non-existent inconsistency into the standard for fundamental error review. Adopting that
rationale would not just upset the balance the Supreme Court so carefully drew in Perry; it would
tip the scales over completely and prevent these critically-important constitutional claims from
ever being reviewed directly.
Rather, under the proper understanding of Perry, no additional facts are needed to see
what the prosecutor actually argued in this case or that those arguments were improperly
disparaging. There is no indication in the record that trial counsel’s failure to object was actually
based on some sort of reasonable trial strategy. Therefore, despite the State’s mere speculation,
the second prong of Perry is still met in this case.

C.

The Prosecutor’s Misconduct Prejudiced Mr. Davis
The State’s only argument on the third prong of the fundamental error standard reiterated

its contention that, because the some of the disparaging comments were only directed at the
trafficking charge, they cannot be said to cause prejudice in regard to the charges on which the
jury actually convicted Mr. Davis. (Resp. Br., pp.9-10) As discussed in Section A, supra, the
prosecutor’s subjective intent does not have much of an impact on the analysis of whether he was
actually committing misconduct or whether that misconduct may have been prejudicial. By its
nature, prosecutorial misconduct can have an impact beyond the prosecutor’s intent. See, e.g.,
Baruth, 107 Idaho at 657-58 (finding misconduct occurred because “[t]hese statements had the
effect—if not the intent—to disparage Baruth’s attorney. All three statements unfairly cast the
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role of a defendant’s counsel” and so were error, though ultimately, not reversible error because
of the overwhelming nature of the evidence in that case). Therefore, the State’s attempt to limit
the scope of the impact of the arguments it effectively conceded were misconduct is unavailing.
Furthermore, while the Court in Baruth weighed the evidence without the error in
determining whether it is prejudicial, Perry reveals that sort of analysis is no longer proper.
Rather, Perry made it clear that the third prong of the test for fundamental error required the
courts to apply the standard articulated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), with the
burden of proof on the defendant. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. The United States Supreme Court
made it clear that it is improper for courts conducting a review under Chapman to weigh the
evidence absent the error themselves. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993). Rather,
that standard requires the courts to determine whether the verdict in this case was surely
unattributable to the verdict. Id. In the context of fundamental error, that means the defendant
has to show “there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial.”
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226 (emphasis added).
In Mr. Davis’ case, there is a reasonable possibility that the jury’s decision to convict him
of the charges it did was based, in part, on the passions or prejudices invoked by the prosecutor’s
disparaging comments regardless of the prosecutor’s intent with his improper comments. Those
comments were designed to get the jury to emotionally reject the defense arguments as being
“ridiculous,” or to convict the jury based on prejudice against him as a “doper,” (a comment
which the State conceded was meant to apply to “the entire case”) rather than, as defense counsel
asked them to do (see Tr., p.279), consider whether the evidence the prosecutor actually elicited
showed guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the reasonable possibility remains that the
jury’s decisions to find Mr. Davis guilty on the other charges were affected by the passions or
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prejudices stirred up by the prosecutor. Cf. State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 294, 301 (2000) (explaining,
in the traditional harmless error analysis, there was still a reasonable possibility that the error
affected the verdict even though there was a possibility the jury could have convicted the
defendant on a proper basis). That means the misconduct in this case prejudiced Mr. Davis with
respect to the charges on which he was found guilty regardless of the specific argument at which
the prosecutor subjectively intended to address with those improper disparaging comments.
Since that means the third prong of the Perry analysis is also met, the prosecutorial
misconduct in this case constitutes fundamental error.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Davis respectfully requests that this Court vacate the relevant convictions in this case
and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 6th day of September, 2018.
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